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RESUMEN
Este trabajo intenta desarrollar nuevos marcos teóricos para la rigurosa práctica 
de la historia de los conceptos políticos en los tiempos globales. Expandiendo 
la elaboración de Reinhart Koselleck sobre la construcción de los fundamentos 
metodológicos de la historia conceptual –lo que implica el reconocimiento por 
parte del historiador del carácter localizado del punto de vista por el cual la 
noción misma de “historia” se ha establecido como el efecto autorreflexivo de 
la experiencia moderna de la temporalidad–, este ensayo aspira a radicalizar 
los alcances de la Begriffgeschichte frente a las transformaciones definitivas de 
la composición conceptual que ha determinado los límites de la modernidad 
europea. La categoría de “límite” es, de hecho, crucial para la comprensión de 
lo que está en juego en una historia conceptual global: en la medida en que los 
límites temporales, geopolíticos, económicos y también lingüísticos se encuen-
tran habitados cada vez más por tensiones recíprocas que siempre están sujetas 
a ser politizadas o despolitizadas, es la tarea del historiador conceptual el cru-
zarlos y objetarlos con el propósito de rastrear su origen en la conflictiva na-
turaleza de su genealogía global. Una práctica de este tipo requiere, ante todo, 
problematizar el privilegio atlántico que continúa caracterizando el escrutinio 
historiográfico de los conceptos políticos y descolonizarlos del sesgo teórico del 
Estado moderno europeo.
Palabras clave: Historia de los conceptos políticos, Koselleck, Chladenius,  
historia global.
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to develop new theoretical frameworks for the rigorous prac-
tice of a history of political concepts in global times. By further elaborating on 
Reinhart Koselleck’s construction of the methodological foundations of con-
ceptual history – which imply the historian’s awareness of the situated charac-
ter of the standpoint whereby the very notion of “history” has been established 
as the self-reflective effect of the modern experience of temporality –, this essay 
aspires to radicalize the scopes of Begriffgeschichte vis-à-vis the definitive trans-
formations of the conceptual arrangements that have determined the bounda-
ries of European modernity. The category of “boundary” is indeed crucial as to 
the comprehension of the stakes of a global conceptual history: as far as tempo-
ral, geopolitical, economic as well as linguistic borders are increasingly inhabi-
ted by reciprocal tensions that are always liable to be politicized or de-politici-
zed, it is the task of the historian of concepts to cross or challenge them in order 
to trace them back to the conflictual nature of their global genealogy. Such a 
practice requires first and foremost problematizing the Atlantic privilege that 
continues to characterize the historiographic scrutiny of political concepts and 
de-colonizing them from the theoretical bias of the modern European state.
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1
In one of the most important essays contained in 
Vergangene Zukunft [= VZ],1 “Standortbindung 
und Zeitlichkeit”, Reinhart Koselleck posits, from 
an angle that I am interested in assuming as a start-
ing point for the observations that will follow, the 
complex relationship that ties objectivity and stance in the definition of 
the science of history.2 Any historical knowledge is conditioned by its 
standpoint and hence, so to speak, relative. Only such a situated and, at 
least apparently, relative knowledge is what allows us to critically handle 
history and to make, therefore, truthful allegations about it.
It took centuries for such a development to be possible. In ancient 
historiography, the dominant metaphor to state the reliability of a story 
is that of “bare truth” and its immediate assumption in the discourse 
that relates it. Letting the truth of a story speak by itself is the ideal the 
historian points at. In order to do this – and it is a task of minimiza-
tion that historicism will take on as a methodological premise when 
Leopold von Ranke will claim the possibility and the necessity to show 
1 See Reinhart Koselleck. Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp, 1979. The author warmly thanks Lorenzo Rustighi.
2 See Reinhart Koselleck. “Perspective and Temporality: A Contribution to the 
Historiographical Exposure of the Historical World”, in Future Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time. New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 128-151.
202
Sandro Chignola / Conceptos Históricos 6 (9): 200-221
“how things really went”3 –, it is essential for the historian to give up 
any possible stance. In order to call himself a historian, he must be, like 
Lucian of Samosata, “a stranger” [xénos] with respect to his own work, 
“without a homeland, autonomous and not subject to any sovereign” 
[apolis, autónomos, abasíleutos].4 This ideal of objectivity – i.e. the histo-
rian as a pure mirror of the events he recounts – persists for a long time 
in the reflection about history and only in the modern age it surrenders 
to the consciousness of its impossibility.
It is Johann Martin Chladenius (1710-1759), whose Allgemeine Ge-
schichtswissenschaft Koselleck will repeatedly define unsurpassed as to 
the matter at issue, who marks the point of no return with respect to 
the postulate of the historian’s abstention from judgment or political 
neutrality. For Chladenius, history can only be established prospectively. 
Of course, he still walks the path of vision. Histor, in Greek, is after all 
the eyewitness. Yet here history, even in the primary sources in which 
it is stored, is immediately conditioned by the particular “Sehepunkt” 
that retells it.5 The same facts may be differently represented depend-
ing on the viewer’s point of view, which Chladenius assumes to be ine-
vitably situated in moral, social and material terms.6 “Der Sehepunkt”, 
as Chladenius defines it, although he conventionally acknowledges the 
relationship between the present and those who experience and witness 
it as a constitutive one, “ist der innerliche und äußerliche Zustand eines 
Zuschauer, in so ferne daraus eine gewisse und besondere Art, die vor-
ko mmende Dinge anzuschauen und zu betrachten”.7 A story as such can 
only be conceived of as being free from contradictions, but every account 
of this story will be determined by – which means refracted, reflected, 
subdivided into – the particular prospect that attests to it from a specific 
point of view, of which it is permitted to sketch a provisional classifica-
tion. It becomes an inescapable presupposition for the scientist of history 
to take it for granted that the “fact”, in which a “Sehepunkt” is objecti-
fied, is told by an “interested” person or by a “stranger”, by a “friend” or 
by an “enemy”, by a “learned” or by an “illiterate”, by a “bourgeois” or by a 
“peasant”, by a “melancholic” or by a “joyful”, by someone “who is above” 
or by someone “who is below”, by “a rebellious” or by “loyal subject”.8
3 Leopold von Ranke. Geschichten der römischen und germanischen Völker. Leipzig, Dunker 
& Humblot, 1885, p. VII.
4 Lucian of Samosata. Quomodo historia conscribenda sit. Oxonii, 1776, XLI, p. 55.
5 Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft, worinnen der Grund zu ei-
ner neuen Einsicht in aller Arten der Gelahrheit gelegt wird. Leipzig, 1752, II, § 17.
6 See Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft…, V, § 11.
7 Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft…, V, § 12.
8 See Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft…, V, §§ 17-23.
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Chladenius draws two conclusions from this framework. The first 
one is that patently any intuitive judgment can only be dealt with as 
unilateral and relative. “Ein Zuschauer erlangt keine vollständiger Ge-
schichte”, he writes.9 There can be different accounts of the same story, 
each of them claiming to be true. The second, which derives from the 
same analysis that “subjectivates” the standpoints of the evidences as-
sumed as historiographic sources, is that historiography itself, as far as it 
is the representation that subsumes and uses them, cannot be said to be 
but perspectival (VZ: 185-186). The original image of a story (“Urbild”) 
is transformed and altered (“geändert werde”) throughout its conversion 
into “Erzählung”, into the tale which repeats it.10
Nevertheless, the fabrication of perspectivism – Koselleck ascribes 
this, even before Chladenius, in whose work it is a principle of the 
method, to the metaphor of the historical telescope used by Comenius 
– is not limited to such a twofold premise, which turns the source into 
a situated testimony and the narrative into a representation resulting 
from a point of view. Here is an authentic “Akt der Befreiung” for the 
historian, who finally gains the position that allows him to freely “build 
up” history by making connections, by changing the start- or end-point 
of a story, or by drawing interpretive hypotheses from the specific valori-
zation of certain elements highlighted by the sources, rather than others 
(VZ: 187). Much more radically, however, this same perspectivism func-
tions as a principle of temporalization of history itself. If, by means of 
it, it is possible to assume the spatial relativity of the standpoints and 
to push this assumption up to the position occupied by the historian, 
who thus emancipates himself from the impossible commitment to the 
neutral statement of facts, it is also possible to fluidify chronology and 
to achieve a specific quality of duration. The storytelling retrospectively 
affects the past and allows it to be seen in a new way.
In the theoretical debate that took place in mid-18th century Ger-
many – Gatterer, Schlözer, Büsch, among others and, in any case, beside 
Chladenius – this approach acquires a quite decisive relevance. It allows 
to deconstruct the position held by direct testimony with respect to an 
idea of chronology according to which history, always contemporary to 
the source that relates it, gradually builds up its accumulation. Instead, 
it is now the prospectively farther “Sehepunkt” that proves able to filter 
events by judging their relevance depending on the problems or priori-
ties that place it in the most recent point in history, while at the same 
time opening its depths. The keynote of historiography is no longer the 
9 Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft…, V, § 26.
10 See Johann Martin Chladenius. Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft…, V, § 12.
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vanished present, whose veracity is guaranteed by the direct testimony, 
but a past thoroughly temporalized by the present that constructs it 
and represents it as its own antecedent. Historical science investigates 
the past the same way it becomes aware of its own temporal placement 
(VZ: 191-192).
There are two more significant consequences here. The first one 
marks out the modern solution to the paradox we started from, where 
truth-telling and taking a stance seemed to be contradictory. Truth and 
prospect, in fact, are in no way separable. This awareness grows in the 
context of the reflection on the science of history in the second half of 
the Eighteenth century, far before Nietzsche. The second consequence is 
equally decisive and is determined in particular by the sudden accelera-
tion of individual and collective experience brought about by the French 
Revolution. The “Sehepunkt” is itself mobile in the framework of an ir-
reducible temporalization of the spaces of experience. The prospect that 
historicizes history by choosing the point of view that can instruct and 
critically evaluate, it in the light of what progress only makes available 
(knowledge, skills, technicalities unavailable in the past), must in turn 
submit to reflection, since the point of view changes contextually all 
along the historical movement. Not only does the present overtake the 
past (and thus the very past present of the sources), but the present itself 
will soon be overcome by the future that turns it into the past. The vor-
tex of temporalization overwhelms history and radically resemantizes 
its concept, its content and its practices.
Hence, the last step I am interested in. Along with such a radical 
temporalization of history, a few other decisive consequences follow. 
The first one concerns the problem of judgment. If 18th-century his-
toriography already builds up its own perspectivism, as an effect of the 
observer’s irrevocable stance, the present of the French Revolution, 
around which revolves the most drastic break between past and future, 
now compels, as a further supplement, to take sides. The past, as well as 
the transformation of the present into the past, on the one hand, and 
into the future, on the other, demands that the historian justify his own 
position within a single line of temporality that subsumes all possible 
stories. The Revolution marks the threshold that aligns in a single set 
individual or collective experiences that may then be judged as progres-
sive, regressive or reactionary with respect to one and the same process.
In German, the singular “Geschichte”, history in itself, wipes out 
the parataxis of the histories that had for centuries corroborated the 
motto “historia magistra vitae”, along with the idea of repeatability of 
experience that had validated its consistency (“Historia magistra vitae. 
Über die Auflösung des Topos im Horizont der neuzeitlich bewegter 
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Geschichte”, VZ: 37-66).11 Now, when it comes to history, it is all about a 
unique development related to modernity understood as a project. Even 
the facts, which are unreachable in objective terms, are from now on 
inevitably conditioned by judgment. The historical question to be an-
swered is, as exemplified by Koselleck through Friedrich von Gentz’s 
words, if Louis XVI was murdered (as it is the case for reactionary his-
toriography), executed (as in revolutionary historiography), or punished 
(as for liberal historiography); not the “fact” that a guillotine of a certain 
weight detached his head from the trunk (VZ: 203). Louis must be 
judged by History and by the historian, for whom there is no possible 
shelter: his story must judge, since it is only by (re)building the sense of 
that affair that he can redeem the meaninglessness of the empty flow 
of time and accomplish his own ministry. An event exists only when it 
converges with its scientific representation and the story as a set of ac-
tions resolves itself into its own knowledge. This is the landing place of 
the path imposed by the modern science of history.
We now have all the elements that are necessary to move further. 
The difficult balance that the science of history has to preserve, once 
assumed as unescapable the premise that historically establishes it as 
a form of knowledge, is between the discourse that lays down in the 
sources (lexicon, categories, concepts) and the interpretation that ap-
proaches it. For Koselleck, a story is never identical to the sources that 
document it. And this is obvious, since otherwise every single source 
would already be the story that we want to know. This is a problem 
Koselleck states on several occasions, for example against Otto Brunner, 
by highlighting the necessity to get out of the naivest of historicisms. A 
story is never identical to the sources that document it because, though 
exercising a “Vetorecht” against the historian who mobilizes them (VZ: 
206), which means defining the limit that the interpretation cannot 
overcome, yet, in order to be organized and tell their story, the sources a 
theory which makes them speak.
We are dealing with a vigorous anticipation. Historical knowledge, 
and that is what we have learned from the development leading to the 
foundation of the science of history, is always about something more 
than what we find in the sources. Not only are our problems transform-
ing something into a source, but every source rallied by interpretation 
points back to something different – something more or something less 
– with respect to the source considered in itself (VZ: 204). The practice 
of historiography needs theory. Only the hypotheses that the historian 
11 See Reinhart Koselleck. “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the 
Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process”, in Future Past…, pp. 26-42.
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anticipates build up the documentary series that allow us, without forc-
ing them, and, indeed, respecting their specificity, to incorporate the 
sources into the discourse of history.
A source can never tell us what we should say. However, it will always 
prevent us from making statements that it is not legitimate to do. The 
sources exercise their veto-power by making it impossible to venture in-
terpretations that prove to be unreliable with respect to them. Koselleck 
recovers here the balance between the “truth” of the sources and perspec-
tivism: stance and objectivity intertwine in the field of tension formed by 
both the process of exegesis of the sources, to which we shall return right 
away, and the process of construction of theory. This is the only way the 
apparent paradox we started from can find a solution (VZ: 207).
2
The reflection that Koselleck develops with reference to the “Begriffs-
geschichte” –a lexicographic practice whose inauguration dates back 
to the 19th century – can only be understood if we take on what we 
have just come up with. A history of political and juridical concepts 
can only be written from the point of view of a theory that posits the 
problem of the “the dissolution of the old world and the emergence of 
the new”, that is, by assuming the decisive fracture between the past 
and the future produced by a philosophy of history which opens up 
the gap between the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expecta-
tion”. Through what Koselleck calls the “Sattelzeit”, that is, the tem-
poral threshold between mid-18th and mid-19th century, the historical 
process accelerates towards the future, the only possible thing to say 
about it being that it will be by all means different from the past. This 
same future, which acts as a whirlpool with respect to individual and 
collective experience, forces us to take a stance in order to give sense to 
the present that anticipates it.
This leads to a radical resemantization of traditional political and 
social concepts. Concepts that had hitherto expressed and retained a 
certain content, undergo a quadruple process of democratization (since 
they are used in contexts that are no longer exclusive to the academic 
debate), ideologization (they convey opposing political projects), po-
liticization (they determine processes of conflictual identification), and 
temporalization (they are modulated as vectors of different ideas of the 
future), which provides them with a semantic value irreducible to that 
expressed previously, when, between the antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
the dominant experience was that of repeatability of time. Studying the 
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history of concepts means for Koselleck to be able to take on a privi-
leged perspective in order to describe the process of emergence of the 
contemporary age and thereby to valorize historical sources according 
to a criterion of significance that encodes them as integrated in the 
project of emergence of the world we belong to – although we will see 
that this hypothesis is somewhat problematic (“Begriffsgeschichte und 
Sozialgeschichte”, VZ: 107-129).12
Koselleck’s model, especially thanks to the applications testified by 
the Lexikon der geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, has become the reference for 
conceptual history in several countries and in different linguistic areas, 
both European and non-European. In particular, the attempt to create 
a synthesis between social history, constitutional history and intellec-
tual history has been appreciated for its evident potential for innovation 
with respect to the history of ideas (which, even in its most accredited 
international models, uncritically assumes the semantic scaffolding as 
uniquely defined in its content and as a permanent substrate throughout 
its modifications) or legal history (which usually does not contextualize 
its own categories and tends to reproduce them in the continuity of the 
history of institutions).13
For Koselleck, political and social concepts, considered as indica-
tors, as concrete factors of historical development, have no history in 
themselves. Yet they contain history. This further assumption, which is 
decisive in order to reconstruct the different experiences of time strati-
fied in the apparently univocal significance of a concept, is what allows 
Koselleck to articulate the relationship between conceptual history and 
social history.
Let us take a concept like that of freedom. The history that can be 
reconstructed is made by the radical modification of its meaning in 
the transit beyond the “Sattelzeit”, in which it becomes the singular 
collective leading to the depletion of the plural and differentiated li-
bertates of the world of estates (with reference to the exemptions and 
privileges pertaining to the system of common law that encodes them). 
12 See Reinhart Koselleck. “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”, in Future Past…, 
pp. 75-92.
13 See Melvin Richter. “Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) and Political Theory”, Political 
Theory, Vol. 14, Nº. 4, 1986, pp. 604-637; “Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas”, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 48, Nº. 2, 1987, pp. 247-263; The History of Political 
and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995; 
“Begriffsgeschichte in Theory and Practice: Reconstructing the History of Political Concepts 
and Language”, in William Melching and Wyger Velema (eds.): Main Trends in Cultural History: 
Ten Essays. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1994, pp. 121-149; Keith Tribe. 
“The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe Project: From History of Ideas to Conceptual History”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 31, Nº. 1, 1989, pp. 180-184.
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But it is also made by the anchorage to expressive areas that, although 
contemporary to one another because they are present within the con-
cept’s scope of significance at a given moment, nevertheless belong to 
non-contemporary series of historical experience. At the end of the 19th 
century, freedom can still have radically different meanings for a farmer 
of the Bavarian Alps, for a nostalgic of the estates, or for a revolution-
ary militant, all of whom live in the same glimpse of history. In this 
sense, Koselleck’s idea of “Zeitschichten” can be mobilized to describe 
structures of significance that give decisive relevance to social history 
compared with an otherwise truly simplified image of the progressive 
flow of temporality. Harry Harootunian has made it the key to a prob-
lematization of capitalism’s global process as well as to a postmarxist 
reading of Marx.14
With this, however, a certain amount of issues remains unresolved. 
Not only the standpoint that is needed in order to interrogate the sour-
ces and to trace the history of concepts is that of a “Sattelzeit” which is 
relevant, certainly, yet drastically Eurocentric or at least Atlantic, if by 
Atlantic we mean the prospect that by the time of the Cold War spread 
in historiography to indicate the process of market formation, its in-
stitutions and the liberal model corresponding to them.15 Furthermore, 
such a standpoint is lined up to an idea of modernization which tends to 
elude the problems that cut across it, especially if it is observed from the 
perspective of its depletion, that is, from the point of view of the closing 
of the temporal gap of the “horizons of expectation” in the globalized 
world to which we now definitely belong.
In other words, the history of political concepts operating from Ko-
selleck onward, although referred to the often overlooked problem of 
the genesis and transformation of the basic concepts of the German 
language, never problematizes the standpoint from which it summons 
the sources and makes them speak, though respecting the “Vetorecht” of 
their objectivity, and does not care whether the “modern world”, whose 
genesis it wants to trace, might actually be filled with contradictions, 
streaks, and heterogeneities which blow up its ideal type. Moreover: it 
assumes this ideal type as fully determined by European constitutional 
history and its heading toward the State.
Hence, a series of problems I think I have to highlight. The first and 
most relevant issue, in our current perspective, is the one related to the 
14 See Harry Harootunian. Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism. 
New York, Columbia University Press, 2015.
15 See Bernard Baylin. Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2005; Jürgen Osterhammel. Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 
19. Jahrhunderts. München, Beck, 2009.
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Atlantic world. While it is true that Koselleck’s “Sattelzeit” is also the 
threshold that imposes a new impetus to colonization, which is now dif-
ferent from the imperial forms of the 15th and 16th centuries, because 
what is being formed here by virtue of technical acceleration is indeed 
a single world traversed by the definition of hierarchies, imbalances and 
gaps meant to persist as long as they are able to organize institutions 
and dimensions of governmentality that go far beyond mere robbery, yet 
keeping that kind of “Sattelzeit” as a model of general temporalization 
of history would obviously mean arranging global history under the aus-
pices of one and the same paradigm of modernization. The whole history 
would be subsumed by a point of precipitation that functions, even where 
attempts were made to multiply and differentiate the “Sattelzeiten”, as a 
fundamental catalyst in determining the standpoint that qualifies politi-
cal history in terms of legal, national or European history, as far as it is 
completely bound to the western model of political and social relation-
ships.16 Paul Gilroy, as everybody knows, has worked out a radically differ-
ent idea of what it means to develop an “Atlantic” prospect.17
A second problem seems to me just as important. We need a theory 
in order for the sources to start speaking: in this statement, Koselleck 
sums up a centuries-old process of formation of the science of history. 
Not only, however, does such a theory assume the process of formation 
of the European State as an ideal type, by charging it with the task of 
defining what the “basic concepts” of politics are – the effect it produces 
is to round up all historical sources, including the oldest ones, irreduc-
ible to the modern experience of the State, by reading them in the light 
of the centrality of concepts that will only be such, that is, “basic”, within 
the framework of the modern juridification of the political in European 
constitutional history. It also lines up in one single process, defined in 
the shadow of the State, asymmetric or heterogeneous series that only 
acquire their meaning with reference to the dialectical relationship that 
modern law, in Carl Schmitt’s terms, aims at mediating.18 The alien, the 
16 See Jörn Leonhard. “Erfahrungsgeschichten der Moderne: von der komparativen 
Semantik zur Temporalisierung europäischer Sattelzeiten”, in Hans Joas and Peter Vogt 
(eds.): Begriffene Geschichte. Beiträge zum Werk Reinhart Kosellecks. Frankfurt am Maim, 
Suhrkamp, 2011, pp. 423-448; Javier Fernández Sebastián. “Tradiciones Electivas. Cambio, 
continuidad y ruptura en historia intelectual”, Almanack Guarhulos Nº. 7, 2014, pp. 5-26; 
Ulrike Kirchberger. “Multiple Sattelzeiten. Zeitkulturen in der atlantischen Welt”, Historische 
Zeitschrift, Vol. 393, Nº. 3, 2016, pp. 671-704.
17 See Paul Gilroy. The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness. London, Verso, 1993.
18 See Gennaro Imbriano. Le due modernità. Critica, crisi e utopia in Reinhart Koselleck. 
Roma, Derive Approdi, 2016; Der Begriff der Politik. Die Moderne als Krisenzeit im Werk von 
Reinhart Koselleck. Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2018; Sandro Chignola. “La politica, il 
Politico e il suo concetto. Koselleck, Schmitt, la Begriffsgeschichte”, Filosofia politica, Vol. 30, 
Nº. 2, 2016, pp. 233-256.
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enemy, the barbarian, the heathen or the Jew are thus recovered into 
a single form of juridification of political relations, whose “concept” is 
derived from European modernity, and entirely embedded in its process 
(“Zur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriffe”, 
VZ, 211-259). 19 The theory that mobilizes the sources by virtue of the 
dictate which makes them meaningful “for us” – here Koselleck directly 
enacts Max Weber’s methodological prescription20 – engenders an effect 
of colonization by western and modern categories that works on the 
history of political thought both “vertically” (the antique being filtered 
by the legal and political lexicon of the State) and “horizontally” (by 
leveling, homogenizing, and compatibilizing other experiences of his-
tory and politics with the European one, thus tracing them back to its 
model, albeit by difference).
Finally, there is a third decisive matter. A history of concepts based 
on Koselleck’s model is not able to work on itself retrospectively, namely 
to historicize the idea of contemporaneity it operates with. Working on 
the terminology of politics – I have emphasized it on other occasions 
– means de-termining the experience of the State as much backward as 
forward.21 Terminus is the Latin god of borders. I intend to argue that 
if the discontinuity imposed by modernity is caused by the irruption of 
the State and coincides with the history of the State – an irruption that 
implies the catastrophe of the ancient and medieval idea of politics as 
well as the imposition of a logic, that of sovereignty, which marginal-
izes, when it does not fully obliterate, even in the Western world, other 
modalities (republican, federalist, communitarian or communist) of the 
individual and collective experience of history – then for the last few 
decades we have been able to say that this history has somehow come 
to an end. The State exists, of course, and it exists in the same national 
layout it has been endowing itself with over the last three centuries. Yet 
its existence – overwhelmed by globalization,22 by the migrations over 
which it claims to take control,23 by the rise of post-statual forms of 
19 See Reinhart Kosel leck. “The Historical-Polit ical Semantic of Asymmetric 
Counterconcepts”, in Future Past…, pp. 155-191.
20 See Max Weber. Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis 
(1904), in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Tübingen, Mohr, 1922, p. 170.
21 See Sandro Chignola and Giuseppe Duso. Storia dei concetti e filosofia politica. Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 2008; Sandro Chignola. “History of Political Thought and the History of Political 
Concepts. Koselleck’s Proposal and Italian Research”, History of Political Thought, Vol. 23, Nº. 
3, 2002, pp. 517-541.
22 See Saskia Sassen. Territory, Authority and Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.
23 See Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson. Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. 
Durham, Duke University Press, 2013.
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spatiality24 and governance,25 by the financialization of capitalism – has 
become, so to speak, ghostly.
De-termining the experience of the State by its own “terms”, un-
derstood as its basic concepts, means identifying the point of their 
breakthrough, their operational logic, the resonance effect that they 
produce in the organization of the modern political form (an irre-
sistible sovereignty that cordons the territory of validity of its own 
law; a formulation of the bond that leaves the citizens free because it 
is conceived as the expression of their equality and general will; the 
monopoly of violence exercised by the sovereign as a guarantee of 
the integral incorporation of the latter into the whole of the Nation: 
from Hobbes up to modern western democracies nothing disrupts 
this device), in order to highlight its stopping point; the appearance of 
an epoch that discloses the standpoint from which we are allowed to 
historicize the very modern experience of the State. There is no trace 
of all this in Koselleck.
3
Christian Geulen was maybe the first to hazard an attempt to histori-
cize 20th-century concepts by proposing a set of categories able to de-
fine the “threshold” of escape from contemporaneity, understood as the 
age of national revolutions assumed by Koselleck as a “point of view” for 
the reconstruction of western constitutional history.26 Not only does the 
fall of the Berlin Wall close the horizon of expectation opened up by 
the 18th-century philosophy of history, but the media-based present we 
belong to – the post-ideological and disenchanted present that marks 
the point of access to an “era without expectations” – is crisscrossed by 
the multiplication of experiences and by their arduous processability, 
considering that in many cases they depend on second-rate observa-
tions (media, fashion, marketing) that do not represent the world as it is 
but rather strengthen and extend the way we perceive it.27
24 See Carlo Galli. Political Spaces and Global War. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010.
25 See Wendy Brown. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York, 
Zone Books, 2015.
26 See Christian Geulen. “Plädoyer für eine Geschichte der Grundbegriffen des 20. 
Jahrhunderts”, Zeithistorischen Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History Nº. 7, 2010, 
pp. 79-97.
27 See Niklas Luhmann. Beobachtungen der Moderne. Opladen, Westdeutsche Verlag, 1992.
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The precarization of labor, the impossibility of medium or long-
term investments, the difficulty in maintaining consumer standards in 
the neoliberal hyper-competitiveness and in the absence of the wel-
fare guarantees achieved over the 20th-century, erode the chances of 
temporalization of experience. Expectation is no longer tied to the 
idea of the future, but spatializes itself in the present it strives to pro-
long, thus saturating it with anticipations fueled by the market supply. 
If modernity is characterized by a drastic experience of acceleration 
compared to the traditional perception of time, now this same accel-
eration – hyper-acceleration determined by technological develop-
ments, connectivity and pressures that produce intolerable rhythms of 
life – engenders some sort of fibrillation, a sort of stasis traversed by an 
extremely fast oscillation, which immediately dismisses the reliability 
of experiences and expectations and contracts the time spans we can 
call the “present”. Hartmut Rosa elaborates this point precisely with 
reference to Koselleck.28
Geulen, in turn, derives from here a radical problematization of the 
categories of experience and expectation working in Koselleck’s defini-
tion of “Sattelzeit”. It is no longer a matter of anticipating an open and 
different future, which is able to eradicate the traditional areas of expe-
rience by hurling them into the unknown. The present seizes the future 
and detemporalizes it. This means therefore overthrowing the scheme 
that makes it possible for Koselleck – who assumes the Kantian precept 
that there is neither experience without concept nor concept without 
experience – to determine the concepts of the modern experience of 
temporality. The present we live in, on our leave from the short 20th-
century, cannot be categorized as the gap between a “space of experi-
ence” [Erfahrungsraum] and a “horizon of expectation” [Erwartungs-
horizont], but rather as a drastic reversal into a “space of expectation” 
[Erwartungsraum] and a “horizon of experience” [Erfahrungshorizont], 
precisely in its folding in on itself and in its indefinite dilation as a field 
of anticipations devoid of any possible futurization.
It follows that, if Koselleck assumes as the indicators of the transfor-
mation of concepts the processes that ideologize, politicize, temporalize, 
and democratize their power of signification with reference to a future 
experienced as a field of possibilities, we should find other indicators in 
order to visualize the structures by means of which the closure of the 
horizons of expectation fuels the self-reflexive cycle of contemporary so-
ciety. Geulen proposes those of “scientification” [Verwissenschaftlichung], 
28 See Hartmut Rosa. Alienation and Acceleration: Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern 
Temporality, Aarhus, NSU Press, 2010.
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“popularization” [Popularisierung], “liquefaction” [Verflüssigung], and 
“spatialization” [Verräumlichung].
By the first one he refers to the transfer of concepts, ideas, and cat-
egories of single scientific disciplines into others, thus settling in areas 
of knowledge that do not coincide with either of them. Concepts of 
biology or natural history such as “evolution” or “development”, for ex-
ample – but Geulen also makes reference to some technical concepts of 
psychoanalysis – are generalized in their use and become forms of self-
description of the social systems. “Popularization”, which he opposes to 
the category of “democratization” employed by Koselleck, is not related 
to the vulgarization or simplification of the meaning of concepts, but 
to their appropriation and dissemination in the info-sphere. By “lique-
faction”, Geulen means the process by which previously rigid semantic 
structures change through their borrowing from or transferring to other 
areas, thus unexpectedly hybridizing their content. Many of the con-
cepts recurring in the decline of the 20th-century present such features: 
for example, “population”, “body”, “information”, “network”, “interac-
tion”, among others.
However, it seems to me that the category of spatialization is the 
one that gives us more prompts for reflection. By means of it, I argue, 
Geulen refers to what we might call the experience of the becoming-
world of capital, if by this we intend to grasp the discontinuity intro-
duced – compared to the previous imperial forms of accumulation – by 
the algorithms that mark the contemporary financialization of value. 
Geulen points at the saturation effect produced on the one hand by 
the conclusion of the cycle of “discovery” and colonial domination of 
the world, and on the other by the rise of a global market that entraps 
the whole space in its own process, thus subordinating it to a different 
use of temporality. This is not a matter of acceleration, but a matter of 
“räumliche Weltverdichtung”, that is, a compression of space and time 
in the networks of data circulation and mining, in the algorithms of 
logistics and transport, in the movements of mass migration, which of 
course do not abolish time but rather accelerate it, so to speak, “on the 
spot”.29 The present is an oscillatory one, made of constant fibrillations, 
filled up with exchanges, but in fact devoid of prospects, or possibilities, 
of futurization.
Geulen does not take it that far. He employs the category of spatiali-
zation in order to point out how the 20th-century, which represents the 
target of his historicization, is marked by experiences of territorializa-
tion that are left behind by the crisis of the notions of progress and 
29 Christian Geulen. “Plädoyer für eine Geschichte der Grundbegriffen…”, p. 89.
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history pertaining, instead, to the philosophies of history Koselleck as-
sumes as the indicators of the “Sattelzeit” between the 18th and the 19th 
centuries. From communism as a prospect of liberation to “socialism 
in one country”; from Darwin’s evolutionism to the Nazi racial fixism, 
along with the resulting “Daseinskampf ” in the fierce competition for 
the “living space”; from the predominance of concepts of movement 
(“civilization”, “enlightenment”, “modernization”) to the predominance 
of geographical or national characterizations that mark the appropria-
tion and consequent segmental irradiance of tendencies (“americaniza-
tion”, “sovietization”, “germanization”, “balcanization”).
If we are interested in discussing the possible coordinates of a history 
of concepts in a global perspective, however, the category of “spatializa-
tion” seems to provide further incentives.
The first point brings us back to the becoming-world of capital. It 
seems to me that we should assume not a form but rather an operational 
logic of connection, hierarchization, and valorization of heterogeneous 
spaces, where flows of living beings, productive processes, and data are 
territorialized by virtue of synchronizations, imbalances or disjunctions 
of times. Contrary to an image that has long been predominant in the 
debate on globalization, which duplicates, even though by reversing it, 
the debate about the end of history, we do not live in a smooth and 
post-historical present.
By analyzing the keynotes of a “spatial turn” in global history, Mat-
thias Middel and Katja Naumann, have pointed out that the flows of 
data, living and goods, travelling the world with no more easily rec-
ognizable starting points nor strictly fixed paths, are the object of as-
semblages that involve trajectories of both deterritorialization and re-
territorialization of global dimensions.30 The historian who wants to 
raise the question of globalization – as I have pointed out earlier, it is a 
process that cannot be assumed in continuity with the formation of the 
world-system, but rather marks a profound discontinuity with respect 
to the categories employed to study it31 – has to focus on at least two 
things: on the one hand, the objective situation we are facing, and on 
the other the series of political projects, heterogeneous to such an extent 
that they are mutually conflicting, which aim at redefining by the term 
30 See Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann. “Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the 
Impact of Area Studies to the History of Critical Junctures of Globalization”, Journal of Global 
History, Vol. 5, Nº. 1, 2010, pp. 149-170.
31 See Immanuel Wallerstein. The Modern World-System. 3 vols. New York, Academic Press, 
1974-1989; World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, Duke University Press, 2004; 
Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver. Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
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“globalization” the very meaning of the modern notions of sovereignty 
and interdependence. I say political projects because, as I argue, just to 
give an example, both the subjectivity expressed by the migration pro-
cesses and the global legal-administrative devices meant to seize and 
govern them are political.
The dissolution of the national sovereign State’s hierarchical spatial 
order; the multiplication of the actors involved in global interactions; 
the heterogeneity of the spatial dimensions condensed in the assembla-
ges that define the knots (or, better, the entanglements) of the legal, po-
litical and social networks spread out all over the globe. All these things 
provide us with the signature, the “Auszeichnung”, to use a Kantian 
word, of the time we belong to. This also radically changes the “stand-
point” from which we are allowed to build the genealogical perspective 
through which contemporaneity can be historicized and evaluated all 
along the transformation of its conceptual components.
Matthias Middel and Katja Naumann have proposed three new her-
meneutic categories for the “spatial turn” of global history:32 “portals of 
globalization”, “regimes of territorialization”, and “critical junctures of 
globalization”.33 By these notions, which I mention here as a second 
point worthy of attention, they refer to the need to question the relation-
ship between space and time determined by the decentralization of the 
national State, both on the side that deprives it of the monopoly on its 
own history (which, if we assume a global perspective, mostly took place 
outside of it, involving trade relationships, internal and external migra-
tion processes, colonization), and on the side that multiplies it in a series 
of spaces streaked by the combination of cross-border relations and by 
specific processes of territorialization or regionalization, which pinpoint 
heterogeneous dimensions of social, economic, and political spatiality, 
along with the complicated tangle of histories that traverse them.
Furthermore, these same dimensions of space also fix – and this is the 
third thing I want to point out – the points of negotiation or conflict 
between the flowing streams and the structures that control them. His-
tory is made of multiple levels, layers, flaps, sliding plans or blocks that 
must be accounted for in their heterogeneity in order for an archeology 
of the spaces and times of the political to be possible. If concepts emerge 
from experience and in turn experience, in order to be such, demands 
conceptualization, then a history of concepts can only originate from 
32 See Jörg Döring and Tristan Thielmann (eds.). Spatial Turn: Das Raumparadigma in den 
Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften. Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2008; Barney Warf and Santa 
Arias (eds.). The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. London, Routledge, 2008.
33 Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann. “Global History and the Spatial Turn…”, p. 153.
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the recovery, the recognition and the tracking of the different times and 
spaces involved in the complex stratigraphy of global history.
Reinhart Koselleck has employed the category of “contemporane-
ity of the non-contemporaneous” with reference to the layers of time 
mounting up as a specific form of historical experience. The extended 
present, in which it shrinks because of the erosion of the spaces of ex-
pectation, generalizes its possibilities of application34 and suggests the 
suitability of combining Koselleck’s notion of “Zeitschichten” with that 
of “Raumschichten”.35 Assuming both of them means not only snatch-
ing history from the national and sovereignty-based mortgage weighing 
on it due to the Eurocentric paradigm of development that ties it to the 
State – in other words, conceiving history in a multilingual, multi-tem-
poral and heterogeneous way – but also radicalizing the notion of “space 
of experience” or “horizon of expectation” by looking at the different 
fields and places where differentiated forms of the relationship between 
historical actors and their opportunities of action have emerged.
Stratified spaces are the multilevel spaces of experience where sub-
jects uprooted from the frameworks of national citizenship or from the 
affiliations that identify them in administrative or policing terms in-
teract or have historically interacted in times and moments as much 
differentiated compared to the unilinear development retrospectively 
projected by modernity as one’s own history. Historical actors pursue 
interests or bring desires into play; they shape their own experience 
and, so to speak, conceptualize it in historically multilateral and multi-
temporal contexts. They mold spaces and times, which therefore become 
historical, by moving through them.36
A history of concepts in a global perspective should therefore assume 
as its center of gravity the fabric of conflicts, tensions and contradictions 
that, once torn apart the linear idea of temporality, come to the surface 
as the heterogeneous assemblage of spaces and times in a history that is 
once and for all released from the nation, from sovereignty, and from its 
purported Eurocentric balancing.
34 See Helge Jordheim. “‘Unzählbar viele Zeiten’. Die Sattelzeit im Spiegel der Gleichzeitigkeit 
des Ungleichzeitigen”, in Hans Joas and Peter Vogt (eds.): Begriffene Geschichte…, 
pp. 449-480.
35 See Hagen Schulz-Forberg. “The Spatial and Temporal Layers of Global History: A 
Reflection on Global Conceptual History through Expanding Reinhart Kosellck’s Zeitschichten 
into Global Spaces”, Historical Social Research, Vol. 38, Nº. 3, 2013, pp. 40-58. Available in 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-387039, accessed 30 April 2020.
36 See Michel de Certeau. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1984.
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4
It seems to me that a few conclusions can be drawn from all this. The 
first one could be stated as follows. Raising the problem of a history of 
political concepts in a global perspective means, I argue, at least two 
things. On the one hand, it means asking the question of what a “global 
perspective” is, both in relation to its being a “standpoint” (i.e., an oppor-
tunity of historicization with reference to the Eurocentric, sovereignty-
based and national premises implicitly operating in the modern science 
of history), and in relation to its being, indeed, “global” (a concept whose 
history ought to be traced, by taking into account its break, or its points 
of irreducible tension, with respect to the concept of “world”). On the 
other hand, it means maintaining the “subjective” point of view, so to 
speak, that allows us to build the history we are interested in by stay-
ing focused on the instruction and isolation of problems, without yield-
ing to the temptation of “the global petition of reality as a whole to be 
portrayed”, to say it with Michel Foucault, to which historians usually 
surrender.37
A second conclusion, which I think can be drawn, concerns the 
idea of “contemporaneity”. It seems to me that it should be thought 
of both as a threshold for the transformation of modern concepts (the 
era we belong to is very different from the Fordist, sovereign, national, 
“constitutional” 20th-century) and as a quite specific form of composi-
tion – i.e., a tangle of tensions, a compound of stories, a twist of issues 
– between heterogeneous spaces and times. It obliges us to deal with 
conceptual history both synchronically (as much in the present we live 
in as in the different “historical” presents that have intertwined across 
the evolution of its process) and diachronically (by making a genealogy 
of contemporaneity), while staying aware of the multilaterality of the 
access points of its history and of the multi-stratification of the experi-
ences that traverse it. Space and time – the cornerstones of the historio-
genesis of concepts – must be considered as thoroughly denaturalized as 
well as materially organized and innervated by subjective, institutional, 
and “political” practices.
I would like to spell out a third and final conclusion. Concepts are 
not just indicators, but also concrete factors of the historical process, as 
Koselleck reminds us. The practices I have been pointing at contrib-
ute to configuring them. This means that, even in what modern his-
tory regards as its own “margins”, experiences of hybridization with 
37 See Michel Foucault. “The Dust and the Cloud”, in Maurice Aymard and Harbans Mukhia 
(eds.): French Studies in History. Vol. 2. New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1990, pp. 323-233.
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the western vocabulary are processed (appropriations, translations, 
twists) that overthrow its meanings and uses. A history of concepts in 
a global perspective does not know subalternity nor subalterns, because 
it deals with spaces and times regardless of their hierarchization – this 
is a premise that I think should be assumed as operative – thus radi-
cally decentralizing the “standpoint” that (historically) organizes such 
a hierarchy. At this height, the “veto-power” of the sources also gets 
immediately available as political agency. Moreover, and foremost, it 
becomes a direct expression of subjectivity. And this in turn implies 
that the very selection of the sources to be dealt with is problematic: 
provincializing Europe here – to resume Chakrabarty’s worthwhile ex-
hortation38 – also means provincializing philosophy, its authorial series, 
the teleology of significance in which its history is epitomized, in order 
to handle knowledge, along with the concepts and generative grammars 
that produce them, by assuming the relevance that suits them. The his-
tory of political concepts is not the history of the Political. It is rather 
the history of the imaginaries and of the institutional projects that, by 
means of it, have neutralized politics. That very same politics which, in 
the becoming-world of capital, raises immediate expectations – here 
and now – of freedom and equality.
38 See Dipesh Chakrabarty. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.
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